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Abstract  
 
An activity theoretical analysis is presented of an organisation that is operating in a 
rapidly changing sector and whose competitiveness depends upon the design skills of 
its engineers, a number of whom are world experts in their fields.  The Company 
designs high-technology, make-to-order products.  Like other organisations that 
compete through knowledge and innovation the prosperity of this Company depends 
upon its organisational learning, that is, upon the effectiveness with which it can 
mobilise, apply and develop its distinctive knowledge base as circumstances change.  
In the difficult context that the Company faces the speed with which projects can 
move from the initial concept phase through design to production has become 
especially important.  The paper outlines a general strategy for change that was 
developed as the Company sought to control this process and traces the consequences 
for design practices.  An activity theoretical approach is used to model the changes 
that were attempted, the outcomes which emerged and possible future options.  The 
approach emphasises the relevance of an historical perspective on organisational 
change, features the changing nature of expertise in contemporary manufacturing and 
draws attention to the potential significance for collective learning of tensions and 
incoherencies within a work system. 
 
 
Research Approach: Activity Theory and the Nature of Expertise 
 
The authors are part of a multi-disciplinary research team studying the management of 
innovation in high technology organisations.  Our approach has been to regard 
innovation as a complex series of developments from product conception, design and 
manufacture, to adoption.  We are seeking to identify and to study key processes 
within this sequence, to feature the interactions between individuals and contexts and 
to explore ways in which innovation processes may best be managed.  In 
Slappenedel’s (1996) terms, we are developing an interactive process approach to 
organisational innovation. 
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Activity theory, as developed by the Finnish scholar Engestrom (1987) and initially 
applied to organisational analysis by Blackler (1993, 1995) and Holt and Morris 
(1993), has provided the basis for our approach (see also Blackler, Crump and 
McDonald, 1997).  Work in the activity theoretical tradition has influenced 
organisation studies through Lave and Wenger’s (1991) theory of situated learning, 
Brown and Duguid’s (1991) approach to organisational learning, and recent 
approaches to knowledge and competition such as Spender (1995).  The approach has 
its roots in Soviet scholarship, especially in Vygotsky’s psychology.  Like theories of 
practice more generally (see Chaiklin and Lave, 1993) activity theory analyses the 
nature of practical activities and their relationship to the broader cultural, social and 
physical contexts of which they are a part.   
 
Applied to management and organisation studies, the approach theorises expertise.  It 
points to the recurrent and embedded nature of human activities, the tentative nature 
of knowledge and its action orientation, and the significance for collective learning of 
the tensions that inevitably develop within and between activity systems.  In this paper 
we apply the approach to model alternative heterogeneous networks of activity and the 
changing nature of expertise within manufacturing organisations.  We also use the 
approach to analyse the difficulties of moving from one system of organising to 
another, and to explore the opportunities that may be created for organisational 
learning. 
 
The unit of analysis associated with the orientation is the activity system.  Engestrom’s 
(1987) treatise offers a careful analysis of the term, and suggests a general model for 
representing the relationships between personal knowledge and the cultural 
infrastructure of knowledge, and between individual actions and the broader pattern of 
activities of which they are a part.  The notion of “activity” is broader than the notion 
of “action” or “operation” (examples of activity are work, play, research, war) yet 
more restricted than the term “culture”.  As used by activity theorists the notion of 
activity offers a way of linking events to the contexts within which they occur.  As 
adapted on Figure 1, Engestrom’s approach models the relationship between 
individuals, their work colleagues, and the activity in which they are jointly engaged 
(the inner triangle of the figure) and the factors that mediate these relationships (the 
outer triangles of the figure).  Thus the model features the processes through which 
technologies mediate the relationship between a worker and his or her activity, social 
rules mediate the relationship between an individual and his or her work community, 
and the division of labour mediates the relationship between community members and 
their shared activity.  Expertise is analysed as technologically mediated, culturally 
situated and socially distributed. 
 
It would be a mistake to assume that the relationships between intentional, 
psychological, technological, structural and processual factors that are depicted on 
Figure 1 are tidy and clear cut.  In a manner that is reminiscent of the analysis of social 
process developed by symbolic interactionists, see for example Star’s (1997) 
discussion, the activity theory approach emphasises how incoherencies, 
inconsistencies and tensions are integral elements of activity systems.  The point is 
represented by the wavy lines on Figure 1.  It is the conceptions that people have of 
their activities, featured in italics on the right of the internal triangle, that gives  
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                                                             Concepts 
                                                          Technologies 
                                                   Operating procedures 
   
 
 
                                                                             Conceptions of activity 
                                  Individual                             Evolving character of 
                                                                                   practices 
 
 
 
                     
                    Social rules                   Community            Division of labour 
                                                                                                 Division of knowledge 
        Figure 1 
       A General Model of Activity Systems 
Activity systems can be characterised as disturbance producing systems.  The  wavy lines 
represent incoherencies within and between the elements of an activity system. 
 
 
coherence to their individual actions.  Through the determination and creativity that 
people show in enacting their (emerging) conceptions of their activities the tensions 
and “normal accidents” that inevitably and routinely arise within activity systems are, 
as a matter of course, overcome.  Familiar social arrangements do, of course, often 
become entrenched in peoples’ imaginations and practices yet, activity theory 
suggests, the inconsistencies and tensions that routinely arise within and between 
activity systems provide important opportunities for collective learning.  As 
incoherencies and tensions are recognised participants may begin, directly or 
indirectly, to address underlying issues and dilemmas.  The outcome may be the 
development of new conceptions of activity and a reconstitution (or, in activity 
theoretical terms, a remediation) of the elements of an activity system.  This, typically 
hesitant, cyclic process of change is represented in Figure 2.  Activity theory is 
unusual in the centrality it attributes to inconsistency and tension in collective learning 
and in its preoccupation with the dynamics of social and personal change. 
 
 
A Strategy of Change 
 
The study discussed here was undertaken in a leading design and manufacturing 
organisation that specialises in made-to-order opto-electronic products that are used in 
a range of advanced technology defence environments.  It is located on three sites, 
each of which has been a company in its own right prior to being taken over by its 
current owner.  This paper reports developments at the longest established site, East 
Site. 
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1. Established 
 practices and
 activities.
2. Tensions within and
between activity systems.
Growing recognition of
unfamiliar problems. 
3. Search: marked by 
improvisation, debate, new
models and metaphors.
4. Emerging  
priorities and
new approaches
to organisation.
5. Revised pattern
of practices and
activities.
 
 6. Tensions within and
 between activity systems.
 Growing recognition of
 unfamiliar problems.....etc.
 
 
 
Figure 2: 
Tensions and Possible Developments within Activity Systems 
The dotted lines indicate that progression around the 
cycle of development depicted here is typically hesitant and uncertain. 
 
 
Until 1987 the Company as a whole had been trading profitably, however the sudden 
unfreezing of East-West relations saw the company’s markets contract and slump and 
by 1990 its losses stood in excess of £10m.  Government defence contracting had also 
been reorganised in the UK around this time, from a “cost-plus” system that paid for 
development and production costs plus a flat 10%, to a system of fixed-price 
contracting.  A new top management team was brought in to devise a strategy that 
would salvage their position.  Their review of the business showed that the Company 
was in relatively poor competitive shape, over-manned, top-heavy and bureaucratic,  
with a bad record for meeting orders on time.  Its saving grace was its world-class 
range of products and technology. 
 
At East Site the new management team set about their task of creating an organisation 
that was nimble, responsive and ultra-efficient.  They became convinced that only by 
working towards Computer Integrated Manufacturing, supported by a range of 
organisational changes could they bring about the productivity gains necessary.  They 
produced a ten year change strategy which depended on making a series of 
evolutionary changes in organisational structure, each step building on the 
achievements of the preceding step.  The strategy built upon the ideas of the Harvard 
academic Jaikumar who argued (Jaikumar and Bohn, 1992) that manufacturing 
industries need to move away from a static approach to the application of 
technological solutions to organisational problems to recognise the importance of 
contingencies, learning and problem solving.   
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Equipped with such ideas East Site management evolved its approach to the 
development and application of the strategy.  The process was conceived as four 
distinct phases: (i) Co-ordination, (ii) Process Control, (iii) Automation and (iv) 
Systems Integration.  The programme anticipated a shift away from improving 
efficiency by applying established knowledge to a system of manufacture based on 
continual learning about the manufacturing system itself.  An integrated personnel 
strategy was envisaged to support these plans.  A clear implication from the start was 
that the new business would need fewer but better trained employees and, largely 
through voluntary methods, between 1990 and 1994 the Company reduced its payroll 
from approximately 3,000 to 1,050 employees.   
 
Phase one of the change programme, the co-ordination phase, began initially in the 
manufacturing function then moved to design engineering.  Central to this phase was 
the introduction of MRPII (Manufacturing Resource Planning), a computer based 
method.  Team working was also adopted and management levels were flattened.  
These changes were supported by a move into a new purpose built factory.  The 
factory move took place in 1992 and provided the Company with an exceptional 
opportunity to incorporate their new culture and aspirations into the design and layout 
of the working environment.  Many specialist functions that were not part of the core 
of the business were out-sourced.  The whole organisation was involved in a 
benchmarking exercise to establish what features needed to be incorporated into the 
new building.  For East Site the result has been the creation of a totally open plan, 
egalitarian and potentially participative environment. 
 
Phase two of the four phase change programme concentrates on quality via process 
control, doing things error free and on time.  The slogan “Right First Time” is used to 
encapsulate this phase.  Phase two is underway within manufacturing while within 
design and marketing work still proceeds to achieve the level of co-ordination 
associated with phase one.  Phases three and four which will complete the present 
vision of an organisation that is “better, faster and cheaper” than their competitors are 
seen to be 3-5 years away at the present time. 
 
 
The Changing Activity Systems of Manufacturing Organisations 
 
To begin to understand the complexity of the change programme at East Site we used 
the general model of activity systems to represent the distinctive features of different 
“epochs” (or, to adopt Hinings and Greenwood’s, 1988, term “organisational 
archetypes”) of machine tool-based organisations that had inspired the management 
team at East Site, see Figure 3.  Two additional models are included in the figure: a 
prior historical phase (craftwork) and a possible additional stage (“innovation-
intensive” organisations, extrapolated from accounts of recent trends in 
manufacturing, e.g. Florida and Kenny 1994). 
 
Three general points highlighted by this analysis are: 
 
1)  Figure 3 represents the complexity of the changes that are involved in the 
move from one work system to another.  Such transitions involve the 
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1)  Craft Work 
 
 
Simple tools 
Tacit, embodied know-how 
 
 
 
                                                                                    Relatively indeterminate object 
                                               Craftsman                      of work, evolving in the exercise  
                                                                                         of craft skills  (“Artistry”) 
 
 
                                                                                       
                             Codes of practice             Guild        Division of labour based on  
                   Codes of self protection                        individual adaptation, in the  
           context of custom and practice 
 
 
2)  Fordism, Taylorism 
 
 
Complex machinery 
Workers as tools 
Explicit know-how embedded  
in organisational routines 
 
 
 
                                                                                     Predetermined  
                                                   Manager                     object of work  
                                                                                          (“Repeatability”) 
 
 
                                                                                       
                               Procedural rules     Other Managers     Hierarchical, demarcated 
                                            division of labour  
 
 
3)  Process Control 
 
 
Increasingly complex machinery 
Workers as tools 
Techniques for improving control (e.g. MRP2) 
 
 
 
   
                                                  Manager                      Integration for control 
                                                                                          (“Efficiency”) 
 
 
                                                                                       
                               Procedural rules     Other managers      Hierarchical, demarcated 
                                                               Overall system      division of labour 
 
Figure 3: (continued below) 
Changes in Activity Systems within Manufacturing Industry
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4)  Process Improvement 
 
Tightly controlled systems 
Explicit know-how and problem solving 
Techniques for process improvement 
 
 
 
                                                                                     Continuous improvement 
                                         Manager and                        of product and methods  
                                          work group                             (“Effectiveness”) 
 
 
                                                                                       
                                       Rules, plus   Work group      Some flexibility  
                           group co-ordination  and related groups    in division of labour 
                               and co-operation    Overall system      through teamworking 
 
5) Versatile Manufacturing 
 
Integrated technologies 
Technical and organisational 
competencies of key individuals 
 
 
 
                                                                                     Problem identification, 
                                              Expert and                       solution and brokering 
                                       support team                            (“Versatility”) 
 
 
                                                                                           Leadership on the basis of 
                               Task orientation             Team       esoteric expertise 
               Co-operation in group and     System      Multi-disciplinary groups, 
                                     organisation  Customers      flexible task allocation, 
                     Competition externally          Suppliers      internal and external networking 
 
6)  Innovation Intensive 
 
Highly integrated technologies 
Methods for developing collective competencies 
(“think the unthinkable”) 
 
 
 
                                                                                     The developing object and changing 
                                                 Expert in                       context of the activity network 
                                   team of experts                             (“Intervention”) 
 
 
                                                                                       
           Task and service orientation     “Communities of      Collaboration in 
          Dialogue, questioning, within           knowing”      supra-disciplinary groups 
                        and between teams        Project team      Matrix organisation 
       Institutional framework for trust     The Organisation     “Knowledge links” externally 
                    Competition externally    Its (global) network    and to partner organisations 
 
Figure 3: (concluded) 
Changes in Activity Systems within Manufacturing Industry 
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reconfiguration of a complex series of relationships, including conceptual, 
technological, social and structural factors, which are often analysed as if they 
are independent from each other. 
 
2)  The activity theory approach emphasises that each new work system 
involves, indeed depends upon, the development of new practices and 
conceptions of activity.  Whilst management can, relatively easily, provide 
new terminologies, procedures and technologies (and thus influence what 
Schutz, 1967, called the “in-order-to” aspects of actions), changes in peoples’ 
underlying sense of their activities (what Schutz called the “because of” 
aspects of action) are likely to be more difficult to achieve.  For this reason 
alone movement from one paradigm of practice to another is unlikely to be 
achieved smoothly. 
 
3)  The changing activity systems depicted in Figure 3 point to changes in the 
nature of expertise and to new managerial and organisational challenges.  (a) 
Regarding changes in the nature of expertise, activity systems within the 
manufacturing sector are getting more complex internally and more closely 
interrelated to adjacent activity systems.  (b) Regarding emerging managerial 
challenges, later activity systems depicted in the Figure place a premium on 
new approaches to integration, replacing a system of co-ordination based on 
rules and hierarchy with a system that depends upon collaboration, mutual 
adjustment and shared sense making. 
 
 
Alternative Approaches to Engineering and its Management 
 
Over a five month period we interviewed sixty eight design engineers and members of 
the management team associated with the general reorganisation; this included about 
twenty five percent of the total number of design engineers at East Site.  Following a 
period of introductory interviews to orient us towards the problems of the Company 
we developed a semi-structured interview schedule.  We then undertook a 
retrospective study of lessons learned from a project that pioneered movement away 
from “cost-plus” contracts, and subsequently undertook two studies of on-going 
design projects that were of critical relevance to East Site’s future.  
 
Whilst the aims and objectives of the Company’s change programme were well 
understood throughout the organisation a multitude of conceptions of the past and 
emerging situation featured in these interviews.  For example, it became clear that 
there was no single “organisational memory” of the lessons that could be learned from 
the project that we studied retrospectively and no single account of the ongoing 
projects, but that there were various different interpretations of the relevant events. 
 
As we assembled this range of viewpoints we were at first tempted to contrast the 
forward looking but sometimes impatient voice in our interviews of those enthusiastic 
about the four phase change programme with the occasionally reluctant attitudes of 
esoteric experts whose work practices had been transformed by it.  We soon realised, 
however, that something other than a simple clash between old and new management 
style was emerging from our data.  Although the engineers who expressed reservations 
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to us about certain aspects of their new work systems did draw from traditional images 
of design expertise, for the most part they were certainly not harking back to the past 
in a nostalgic way.  Many of them, in fact, were quite likely to ridicule some of the 
practices associated with the cost-plus era.  The criticisms of current arrangements 
that they did raise questioned the practicality of particular aspects of their new activity 
systems and the relevance of procedures and policies of the professed object of 
activity for East Site in future.  We were to conclude that our data reflected less a 
continuing debate between the old and the new and more a growing awareness of 
tensions that were a feature of the new activity systems of engineers and East Site. 
 
The general cycle of tensions and possible developments within activity systems 
depicted in Figure 2 above provides a way of illustrating this point.  In Figure 4 we 
have adopted the approach to summarise key tensions and the sequence in which they 
emerged in the activity systems of design engineers at East Site.  In the remainder of 
this section we draw from our interview data to illustrate this sequence of events.  
Following the sequence presented on Figure 4 we describe engineering activity as it 
was practised in the cost-plus era, trace the problems that emerged as cost-plus 
contracting was abandoned, delineate the new approach to engineering that was then 
introduced, and trace some of the tensions that engineers currently experience. 
 
 
 
   1. The era 
    of “cost-plus” 
    contracts etc.
 2. Demise of “cost-plus”.
 Management discomfort
 with overmanning, 
 outdated methods, long 
 lead times, conservative
 outlooks.3. Search for new
solutions. Image of
integrated, flexible 
system.
4. Concurrent
engineering to 
be introduced in
manufacturing and
production process 
to replace scientist 
inventor in design.
5. New factory,
C.I.M. vision and
“Right-First-Time”
 6. Emerging tensions.
 Engineering discomfort:
 with work pressures,
 concerns about innov-
 ation and development.
 7. Search?
 
 
Figure 4: 
Tensions and Developments in the Activity Systems 
of Engineers at East Site 
a)  The Era of Cost Plus Contracts (Stage 1 on Figure 4) 
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A number of stories about engineering in the cost-plus era featured in our interview 
data.  In these accounts engineering as an activity was equated with problem solving,  
engineering expertise was assessed in terms of the mastery of technological 
complexity, design was practised as a process of trial and error, and heavy emphasis 
was placed on the professional autonomy of individual engineers.  The metaphor of 
the engineer as scientist-inventor can be used to summarise this general approach to 
engineering.  For simplicity of presentation we use the past tense in the description of 
this outlook that we present here although, as we note below, elements of this 
conception of engineering do still remain in the Company. 
 
East Site itself has a long, proud history, the original company being founded late in 
the last century by two academics.  These men were a powerful partnership of 
entrepreneur and inventor and there is no doubt that it is with them that the image of 
engineer as scientist-inventor began.  In the tradition of engineering associated with 
them engineering products were conceived as solutions to technical problems and a 
product was deemed successful when it worked. 
 
In order to be able to continue to solve more and more difficult (and interesting) 
problems the engineer as scientist inventor needed to develop his or her (usually his) 
professional excellence.  One of the ways that this was achieved at East Site was by 
the engineer making sure that each new product contained some novel technology or 
application of technology.  Indeed we were told that East Site prided itself in its 
reputation of making products that frequently surpassed the expectations of its 
customers.  The products East Site supplied would, we were told, often exceed 
product specifications and include extra features, known colloquially as “bells and 
whistles”. 
 
Central to the culture of professional excellence of the scientist-inventor was the idea 
of mentoring.  Design engineers straight from college or university would be 
supported with informal guidance from older, more experienced individuals in the 
same field.  Having completed a programme of ‘book learning’ the design engineers 
were regarded as novices who needed to be introduced to the ways of the real world of 
engineering.  This was done gradually, each task set being slightly more difficult than 
the last.  If the new engineers had problems with their tasks they were expected to ask 
their mentor for advice and if they were to fail the disappointments would often be 
tolerated and be put down to experience.  This system of trial and error for rounding 
off the rough understandings of college courses was related to us by many members of 
the organisation.  One, quite senior, engineer told of his first day at East Site, many 
years previously, when he was asked to go and test a piece of equipment.  Not having 
a clear understanding about what he was doing and being too shy to ask for 
clarification, his efforts were quickly to destroy the unit at a cost which he can still 
recall precisely.  His mentor simply told him he was stupid and that he had better not 
do that too often, and then explained how the equipment worked.  In such a way, 
mentoring worked as a crude form of risk management.  Failure was not seen as a 
completely negative outcome, rather, as the price of learning. 
 
As is suggested by such stories of learning through mentoring, combined with a 
problem solving ethos, the design process of the scientist-inventor featured trial and 
error.  Design was an iterative practice of “build and test”.  Each prototype would be 
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different and better than the last until a stable, reliable, predictable unit was fashioned.  
The process could be likened to the experiments of the science laboratory, and has its 
roots in the idea of engineering as the practical application of the natural sciences. 
 
Associated with the practices of mentoring was a sophisticated “pecking order” 
amongst the engineers.  The significance of this was perhaps best illustrated in a story 
we heard about the drawing office in the old factory.  This office had been heavily 
staffed in its heyday, with each employee standing at a drawing board.  The drawing 
boards were arranged in rows across the floor, facing a large window at one end of the 
room.  A Senior Designer told us how the Chief Draughtsman had his drawing board 
in the prime position for getting the best benefit from the daylight.  All the other 
draughtsmen were arranged in order of seniority by this premise, with the most junior 
being next to the door at the other end of the room.  New draughtsmen would be 
located next to the door, gradual promotion would involve movement from left to 
right across the room and up the rows until, perhaps, the window would be reached. 
 
The engineer as scientist-inventor was primarily concerned with technology, its 
advancement and application.  Experts in different branches of engineering would 
each have different specialist interests that were unlikely readily to be understood by 
others.  Where the success of a product involved problems from several disciplines, 
different experts would work separately from the others; each was concerned with the 
specialist contribution of his or her branch of engineering, trusting the others and 
expecting their own judgements also to be accepted.  Indeed the autonomy of design 
engineers was, we learned, generally accepted by their managers.  This point was 
illustrated in a story we were told about the behaviour of one manager, himself an 
engineer, when he was invited to meet one of East Site’s major customers.  He was, 
we were told, taken on a factory tour, shown work in progress, invited to lunch, and 
informed about the pressures the client was under from a crucial client in government 
to conclude a certain project that awaited a now overdue component on order from 
East Site.  Eventually, when the manager from East Site volunteered no specific 
information on how near this work was to completion, his hosts resorted to blunt 
questioning about when they could expect to get the unit they urgently needed.  The 
manager, we were told, simply replied “when it works”.  He was, this story suggested, 
more inclined to respect the discretion of his engineers to judge when they felt the 
product was “ready” than to respond to urgent pressures from a client.  
 
b)  Tensions (Stage 2 on Figure 4) 
 
As we have already noted in our earlier summary of the change strategy developed at 
East Site, the ending of the cost plus era precipitated the development of extensive 
reorganisation.  As senior managers developed the four phase strategy for introducing 
change each aspect of the image of engineer as scientist inventor was to be called into 
question, then challenged. 
 
Senior managers at East Site were well aware of the way in which inefficiencies had 
been masked, or even encouraged, by contracting arrangements that paid for 
development and production costs plus 10%.  Iterative approaches to design had often 
led to an extension of a projected timescale for a project which added costs but, under 
the cost-plus contracting system, had also added profit.  In this way engineers had not 
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had to consider what one senior engineer described to us as “the cost of failure”; 
indeed, prior to the demise of cost-plus contracting the actual costs of design 
modifications had rarely been made explicit.  Analysis undertaken subsequently was 
to reveal that delays or modifications necessitated by “silly little errors” (e.g. 
specifying 10mm screws for 8mm holes or not choosing a big enough plate on which 
to engrave the product identification code) could involve very substantial additional 
costs when they were identified at the manufacturing stage.  Designers’ additions of 
“bells and whistles” to their projects could also involve significant extra expenditure. 
 
As indicated above, one of the features of the design ethos associated with scientist-
inventor and its learning through mentoring was its sense of tradition.  This was 
viewed as inflexible by management and also by some of the younger engineers we 
interviewed, who explained their frustration with the attitude that the old ways were 
the only ways.  One engineer told us that older designers could be reluctant to consider 
using new materials in their designs, favouring as they did tried and tested approaches.  
We were told how, on questioning one such aspect of a design produced by a senior 
colleague, a young engineer was told “we design Rolls Royces here, my boy, not 
Minis”. 
 
We heard also how, under traditional ways of working, engineers could find it 
difficult to extend their conceptions of the success of a product to include the needs of 
others later in the production cycle.  One story concerned an engineer who had been 
asked to alter his design because the people who were assembling it were having a 
great deal of difficulty inserting one of the screws into a really awkward place on the 
casing of the product.  He could not, we were told, see any need to make changes to 
his original design; “but it works” he assured his project leader.  In fact, the way work 
was traditionally organised in the Company meant that many of the design problems 
that were to come to light during the manufacturing phase were rarely passed back to 
designers.  Once a design was in production staff were, we were told, loath to call on 
the design engineers who they felt were not used to dealing with urgent requests and 
that anyway there was little chance of getting access to a designer who had worked on 
the original design.  One told us that he felt that if he was to “go back upstairs with a 
change they’d just give me anybody and they would panic and give me some fix off 
the top of their head to buy time.  Sometimes I would go and order parts to try it out, 
they would come back to me before the parts even arrived and tell me ‘it won’t work, 
try this instead’”.  Often assembly problems would be solved by manufacturing 
engineers or by technicians assembling the product, both of these groups having 
acquired a wealth of experience in such matters over the years.  Another told us that 
because of such skills “the product that finally went out through the door often bore 
little resemblance to the drawings from which they were supposed to have been 
produced”. 
 
A senior manager at East Site described to us that whilst the company was highly 
regarded for its clever ideas and engineering solutions it also had had a reputation for 
delivering late goods which were often later to be recalled for upgrading.  He alleged 
that during the cost-plus era as much as 80% of the goods made by East Site had been 
delivered to customers late.  A similar point was made by an engineer who ironically 
(but proudly) described a project that he had been responsible for as the “least late 
project ever”.  Another manager told us that there was a culture of last minute effort in 
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East Site alleging that “70% of sales were achieved in the last quarter of each year, 
and 90% in the last week of the month”.  Often such results had been achieved 
through the heroic efforts of individuals who, as year-end or month-end approached, 
would work through the night and inspire their teams to gruelling overtime schedules.  
When they succeeded, such efforts would be rewarded with peer group respect (and 
promotion in some cases) although, as our interviewee pointed out, the fact that 
projects were behind schedule in the first place was often the fault of the very same 
managers who, later, were to work so hard to save the situation. 
 
Figure 5 summarises the activity system of design engineering as science and 
invention and the key problems that were to become associated with it.  
 
 
      Individual knowledge and expertise 
            Iterative techniques involving trial and error 
 
 
       Outcomes & Tensions 
                                                          Design as a       Quality designs. 
Knowledgeable expert                      process of  High costs; late 
                                                               problem      deliveries; traditional 
      solving design choices; isolated  
                design function  
 
        Developmental      Engineering     Sequential 
              orientation,        profession       problem solving 
                mentoring     and peer group     Clearly demarcated roles 
                                                                    and status hierarchy 
 
Figure 5:  
Engineering as Science and Invention,  
Outcomes and Tensions 
 
 
c)  Development and Application: Design as “Production Process” Replaces Design 
as “Science and Invention” (Stages 3, 4 and 5 on Figure 4) 
 
We have already described how, in the changing circumstances in which it found 
itself, management at East Site utilised Jaikumar’s analysis of developments in 
manufacturing to formulate a four phased programme of change.  Because of the 
immediate priorities that East Site faced, the initial launch of the programme of 
strategic change concentrated on the manufacturing function, but an early aim was to  
introduce new approaches to design.  As this began to happen, and in the spirit of co-
ordination and control emphasised in the early phases of the Company’s strategic 
change programme, the new approach featured the importance of objective indicators 
of progress, the adoption of cross-disciplinary teamworking, the “back scheduling” of 
purchasing, and new techniques for managing risk.  The metaphor of design 
engineering as a production process summarises the new outlook that management 
was seeking to introduce.  
 
As the term suggests, engineering as production process is concerned less with the 
autonomy of the individual expert, more with the successful functioning of the overall 
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system.  The aim is to design products in a systematic way, based upon the application 
of pre-determined, optimal techniques so that the customer requirements in the areas 
of technology, timescale and cost could be met with the minimum possible outlay of 
resource by the Company.  Judgement about whether or not a product meets relevant 
aims is no longer left to the discretion of an individual, but is based on objective 
indications of progress towards “milestones”, budgets and specifications.  The 
introduction of new CAD systems, the use of publicly displayed progress charts, and a 
system of regular progress review meetings are tangible examples of the new approach 
in practice. 
 
The tenets of engineering as production process, although informed by the four phase 
change programme specifically, are consistent with many of the techniques and tools 
used in contemporary production and operations management and in particular with 
Concurrent Engineering (see for example Dilworth, 1992).  Central to the approach 
that was adopted at East Site are multi-disciplinary teamworking and resource 
scheduling.   
 
Team working in East Site was  facilitated by the move to a new, open-plan, building 
in the early 90’s.  Multi-disciplinary project teams are collocated within this building, 
i.e. the various specialists which are working on particular projects work at desks that 
are located in the same area for the duration of the project (which, typically, is many 
months or even years).  Where possible this combination of individuals is kept 
constant throughout the whole design life-cycle.  As staff explained to us, the 
arrangement supports greatly improved communications within the teams.  Under the 
previous system the ‘concept’, ‘design’ and ‘manufacturing’ phases would have been 
the responsibility of different people, now the whole team has an influence on each 
stage, regardless of functional disciplines.  Thus, for example, manufacturing 
engineers will be consulted in the very first stages of the design process so that they 
can comment on the potential manufacturability of an emerging design before changes 
would become costly or difficult to introduce. 
 
Such arrangements also mean, we were told, that there is much more joint ownership 
of the design process than previously had been the case.  Prior to the adoption of 
Concurrent Engineering techniques product design, including the building and testing 
of prototypes, had been undertaken completely within the design function.  Once a 
design had satisfied the East Site designers, they “threw the design over the wall” to 
be made by others and the design team was disbanded.  Under the new system, 
however, individuals remain responsible for the design from conception to delivery 
and it should in principle, therefore, be easier for staff to learn from their mistakes. 
 
In order to have more control over the lead time of product design, concurrent 
engineering techniques place a great deal of emphasis on planning processes, indeed, 
the issue of resource timings is perhaps the single most profound change in the 
activity systems of design engineers at East Site.  Each of the tasks associated with the 
design of a product is identified and specified in terms of time, cost and personnel 
resource at the outset of the project.  By working back from the final delivery date (a 
process known as back-scheduling) necessary tasks, purchases needed, machinery 
required etc. etc. can be scheduled, ordered and booked in advance.  One design 
engineer explained for example, that if he needed to order three items for building a 
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unit and the first took two weeks to come while the second had to be ordered from 
overseas and would take four, while the third had to be made especially for the project 
by another company and would take three months, then the first two components 
would not be ordered until two and four weeks respectively before the third would be 
ready.  Operated in conjunction with MRPII tools, considerable savings and 
efficiencies could thus be achieved.  East Site uses the slogans of “Right First Time” 
and “Better, Faster, Cheaper” to characterise the values embedded in these practices 
 
Finally, one other key aspect of the image of design engineering as production process 
at East Site is the development and use of procedures aimed at standardising and 
optimising the design process.  There are a number of these initiatives, but perhaps the 
most visible at the time of our fieldwork was the introduction of new techniques for 
risk management.  These fit very well with the ideas of concurrent engineering and 
“Right First Time”.  During the concept design phase at the start of a new project an 
initial plan for the product is presented and debated by the specialists from all the 
fields involved in the design process.  Participants endeavour to be critical of the 
proposed design and to anticipate elements which are particular risky.  Subsequently 
efforts are made to concentrate on risks that such discussions have identified as crucial 
to the overall success of the project, with targets set and resources allocated 
accordingly. 
 
d)  New Tensions (Stage 6 on Figure 4) 
 
As we have explained the conception of engineering as production process was 
developed in response to the problematic features of the image of engineering as 
science and invention outlined above.  The new approach does, however bring its own 
problems and there is a view amongst engineers in the organisation that the pendulum 
may have been pushed too far the other way. 
 
In our interviews we heard that the rigorous planning that is associated with 
Concurrent Engineering has not proved to be entirely beneficial for innovation 
processes.  Engineers are very uncomfortable with the “Right First Time” goal as they 
feel that, while it certainly is important to think through the product concept early in 
the development process, it is simply impossible to anticipate every eventuality.  Since 
the design process is by nature a journey of discovery, engineers explained, they 
expect to encounter problems along the way.  Indeed, many of the engineers we spoke 
to continued to characterise their role as problem-solving and, they felt, too much time 
invested in early detailed plans is likely to be wasted if problems not identified at that 
stage later necessitate a change of plan.  Similarly it was suggested that the back 
scheduling of parts ordering can mean that by the time a part arrives in the factory, a 
design change may have made it redundant.   
 
One engineer summarised the difficulty saying that “after the concept phase, the last 
thing you need is another good idea”.  If an engineer does happen to recognise a better 
way of doing something on a project than was initially planned he or she may either 
ignore the good idea and continue with the original plan, thus producing a sub-optimal 
product, or the engineer can follow up the new strategy, leading to a time over-run 
perhaps resulting in the project being judged unsuccessful.  Within such a context, 
design risks assume a new importance.  We were told that the risk is sometimes 
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understood to be the risk of failure, rather than a measure of uncertainty   Risk 
management in too rigid a system can therefore become a strategy of risk avoidance, 
with engineers no longer being sure that innovation is what is wanted.  Technological 
risks which have outcomes which are too uncertain to be incorporated in the planning 
process, or which look expensive, are likely to be avoided.  One leading engineer 
pointed out that if return on investment calculations at the outset of a project was the 
only valid measuring stick, then the design for the Boeing 747 would never have been 
pursued (in fact, of course, the 747 was proved to be extremely successful 
commercially and the design approaches it embodies are now widely accepted).  
Another design engineer said that, “if you treat risk as bad and rely on CAD you’ll 
never design anything very different than what already exists”.  For a company relying 
on innovation it would, he observed, be unfortunate if the gains in control that have 
been achieved in the design process began to stifle the creativity of the designers.  
 
Compressing the timescales of a project may not only restrict engineers’ room for 
manoeuvre in managing contingencies, it may also make it difficult for them to learn. 
When development work is costed as if it is a production run little regard will be 
given to the fact that the issues involved may be new to the individuals concerned.  
Where margins are added to reflect a learning curve, it was suggested to us that they 
are often very slight.  One of the hopes of the top management at East Site was that 
time saved through use of new ways of working could partly be used to experiment 
with new approaches and to disseminate the outcome of such experiences throughout 
the organisation.  What seems to have happened, however, is that engineers 
sometimes work long hours in order to work through the inevitable, but unscheduled, 
iterations necessary to see a design through to completion.  They may also work long 
hours in order to familiarise themselves with new tools and techniques.  Rather than 
freeing up their time, therefore, some of the engineers we spoke to felt that Concurrent 
Engineering techniques were somewhat inflexible and that they had introduced an 
element of work intensification leaving them with “no time to think”. 
 
A number of the people we spoke to pointed to certain difficulties associated with the 
system of collocated teamworking.  Whilst there was widespread agreement that 
multi-disciplinary working is essential in the new competitive environment it was 
pointed out to us that the future success of the organisation depends upon the 
continuing abilities of design engineers to work at the forefront of their own fields.  
One of the problems of moving from a functionally based company, where experts are 
located amongst others with similar backgrounds and interests, to one based on project 
teams is that much cross fertilisation of ideas within disciplines is lost.  Two years 
spent working on a project with little peer contact or time to keep abreast of their 
specialist fields inevitably make it difficult for people to stay in touch with new 
developments in their fields.  This issue tended to be associated in our interviewees 
minds with concerns about their career prospects. 
 
The debates listed in this subsection present worries about the new way of organising 
design engineering at East Site as seen by the designers themselves.  From 
management’s point of view, however, it was not altogether clear that the 
reorganisation had yet gone far enough.  One manager told us how, when walking 
around the factory he noticed an engineer staring blankly out of a window.  He asked 
the engineer what he was doing and he replied “thinking” while continuing to stare out 
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of the window apparently unconcerned or unaware of the possible censure of his boss.  
Managers certainly recognised that considerable improvements have been made in the 
efficiency of their engineers at East Site but, in the harsh environment facing the 
Company, the opaque nature of design work continues to concern them.  It was 
suggested to us that, although facts are hard to assemble, engineers probably still 
spend far too small a percentage of their time on engineering (as against routine 
administration, for example), on the right engineering problems, or utilising the most 
appropriate approaches.  
 
Figure 6 summarises the activity of design engineering as production process and the 
tensions that are associated with it. 
 
 
          Individual knowledge and expertise 
             CAD technologies. Back-scheduling 
          Use of milestones. Designs to be ”Right First Time”” 
 
        Outcomes & Tensions 
           Reduced costs & time, but 
                                                                       Design as  accountability issues remain 
                Designer as member                      an orderly  Engineers unable to anticipate 
      of broader system              process  all problems; pressure on  
                                              time and to avoid risks;  
        reduced mentoring.  
 
                   Task orientation        Collocated,     Concurrent  
                                    multi-disciplinary    problem solving 
                         team  
 
Figure 6 
Engineering Design as Production Process, 
Outcomes and Tensions 
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Conclusion: Activity Theory and the Future Organisation of East Site 
 
(a)  Activity theory and the analysis of organisational change 
 
Earlier we used activity theory to compare different approaches to organisation in 
manufacturing industries.  Commenting on the sequence depicted in Figure 3 we 
highlighted (i) the network of changes that movement from one type of activity system 
to another inevitably involves, (ii) the significance of new conceptions of activity to 
such changes, and (iii) changes in the nature of expertise and in approaches to 
management as activity systems become more complex and interrelated.   
 
The East Site case illustrates problems that can occur in relation to each of these 
points.  
 
(i) The network of changes involved in movement from one type of activity 
system to another.  Design as science and invention has strong links with 
craftworking, while design as production process has many similarities with 
the activity systems of Fordism and Process Control.  Looking back on what 
has happened, staff at East Site are well aware of the significance of the range 
of changes that have been introduced in the reorganisation of their work.  
However as efforts are made to move from one paradigm of practice to another 
it is difficult to predict all the issues that may arise.  While East Site invested 
very heavily in new technologies, procedures and systems to support the move 
to production process little had been done also to develop the group and 
leadership skills that are essential for multi-disciplinary groupworking. 
 
(ii) The significance of new conceptions of activity to such changes.  
Considerable successes have been achieved in the Company’s change 
programme (the strategy of change, the reorganisation, the new factory and 
plans for expansion are now everyday features of life at East Site) and overt 
expressions of discontent are rare.  However a number of our interviewees did 
express reservations about the conception of engineering activity that has 
underpinned the early phases of East Site’s change strategy.  As the name we 
have given it suggests, production process has its origins in an analysis of 
manufacturing organisations; criticisms we heard amounted to the suggestion 
that the tenets of mass production are of limited value as guidelines for design 
engineering practices in make to order firms.  The discontent with production 
process that was expressed to us could be interpreted as an expression of 
dismay at the passing of older approaches to design, or perhaps of irritation 
with the inevitable increases in accountability and control that are a feature of 
Concurrent Engineering systems.  Indeed, as we have already noted, at the start 
of our interview programme we anticipated that staff might well express 
nostalgia for the past.  In fact, however, we did not encounter this to any 
significant degree.  New approaches to engineering at East Site were criticised 
on pragmatic grounds.  Expectations that the design process should be “Right 
First Time” are unrealistic or even unwise, we were told. 
 
The issue is complex.  Some branches of engineering do lend themselves to 
advanced planning more satisfactorily than others.  Also, even in situations 
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where a total product run may be no more that four or five units design 
solutions developed for earlier, related products undoubtedly need to be 
incorporated within them.  Nonetheless, we were told, mass production 
engineering does not provide a good model for this process.  One interviewee 
expressed the point as follows.  In car manufacturing, where designers work 
with enormous data sets gathered from years of ‘build and test’ work, there is 
hardly ‘black art’ left at all he said.  “There is probably no axle design left 
unthought of, untested, unrecorded and the designers have all that experience 
and certainty at their fingertips”.  In such circumstance computer simulation of 
potential problems with design variations can achieve much, and continual 
minor but cumulatively significant improvements can be attained in the 
production process.  But where more significant innovations are required (as 
an example the interviewee compared their work to the development of the 
internal combustion engine) a different orientation is required.  Where 
significant new design challenges are continually appearing design must be 
treated as an experimental, iterative process.  A new metaphor for engineering, 
as yet not articulated at East Site, is needed to capture the current imperatives 
for system’s integration on the one hand and for iterative approaches to 
problem solving on the other. 
 
(iii) Changes in the nature of expertise and in approaches to management as 
activity systems become more complex and interrelated.  The activity systems 
of the Engineers at East Site are now undoubtedly more complex and 
interrelated than they were in previous times.  New CAD technologies and 
“back-scheduling” techniques, multi-disciplinary team working and concurrent 
problem solving, pressures to reduce lead times and to work ever more closely 
with customers and suppliers are obvious examples.  Changes anticipated in 
the ongoing change programme are likely to contribute further to the process, 
for example, new systems are being introduced to link design ever more 
closely to sales and marketing.  In such circumstances new approaches to 
integration are likely to assume increasing importance.  For example, the 
strong leadership that was necessary to steer East Site rapidly from one clear 
and well understood work system to another is likely to be less effective as a 
method for integrating the highly complex and interrelated work systems that 
are currently emerging. 
 
(b) Activity theory and the management of future developments 
 
Through the overview it offers of relevant processes, activity theory can be used to 
explore what might usefully be done to stimulate new conceptions of activity, to 
achieve improved integration within expanded activity systems and to manage 
movement between different paradigms of practice.   
 
First, regarding the development of new concepts of activity and improved integration 
within activity systems, the approach we have used to analyse developments at East 
Site suggests that in organisations where activity systems are growing in complexity 
and interrelatedness a range of new skills, outlooks and resources are required.  First, 
as Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) report in their general analysis of expertise, the process 
through which novices become expert involves a developing fusion of classroom 
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instruction and experience, a growing ability to plan ahead and to focus less on details 
more on total situations, and finally the ability to act both spontaneously and skilfully.  
The process through which experts learn to act “as one” with their tasks is, in activity 
theoretical terms, the process through which learners become skilful in utilising the 
infrastructure of their activity systems to pursue the object of their activities.  
Situations where the infrastructure of activity systems is becoming increasingly 
complex present new challenges to experts who must, in these circumstances, become 
competent in the use of a wider range of techniques and procedures.  Second, note that 
the introduction of the new elements in an activity systems do not necessarily merely 
make it easier for experts to do things that they would have done anyway but, as at 
East Site, they can transform the overall character of the activity system.  As activity 
systems grow in complexity and interrelatedness participants need to become aware of 
the broader endeavour of which their contributions are but a part and preoccupation 
with restricted functional priorities must give way to an expanded sense of activity.  
Finally, integral to this development is the development of new approaches to 
integration and control.  Multi-disciplinary working, which involves the co-ordination 
of different specialists each of whom are applying their specialist approaches, must 
give way to supra-disciplinary working, where collaboration takes place between 
experts who are all contributing to the joint development of a shared agenda. 
 
Their are few models in the literature which describe this process.  Eisenhardt and 
Tabrizi’s (1995) description of strategies used by American firms in order to reduce 
the lead times for new products is consistent with this outlook however (they 
concluded that iterative learning and flexible processes within multi-functional teams 
were more effective than efforts merely to speed up traditionally organised systems) 
and Weick and Robert’s (1993) analysis of collaboration on an aircraft carrier mirrors 
the account developed in this paper.  Organisations that need to achieve high 
reliability rather than high efficiency need, Weick and Roberts suggest, to reconsider 
conventional approaches to co-ordination.  Using the example of the operation of an 
aircraft carrier under combat conditions they suggest that a complex process of 
collective self-regulation (which they describe as a “collective mind”) can be 
developed. This involves a process of “heedful interrelating” as participants 
simultaneously contribute to an activity, represent to themselves what is happening 
around them, and interrelate and subordinate their actions within the unfolding 
situation.  The speed at which interactions must take place in the situation Weick and 
Roberts analyse is unusual.  Nonetheless their analysis resonates with the account 
offered here of the significance of new and complex infrastructures of action within 
manufacturing industry, the importance of expanded conceptions of activity, and the 
need for new patterns of interdependency.  
 
Second, regarding movement between paradigms of practice, central to activity 
approach as we have depicted it on Figure 2 is the recognition of tensions within and 
between activity systems and the development of search processes for their resolution 
(stages 2 and 3 on the figure).  Note that, in the case of East Site, it was senior 
management who first recognised the gravity of problems revealed by the ending of 
the cost-plus era (Figure 5) and who worked determinedly to develop, communicate 
and apply a new blueprint for the future.  On the other hand, current tensions in the 
activity systems of engineers (Figure 6) are primarily the concern of design engineers 
and reflect a new set of difficulties.   
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Situations change and, as this case illustrates, solutions to past problems may 
themselves become the source of future difficulties.  However participants may not 
always recognise how things have moved on.  In the particular case of East Site there 
is a danger that management may remain unsympathetic to the current concerns of the 
engineers, confusing their current concerns with any past reluctance to move from 
science and invention to production process.  Nor may people easily appreciate the 
need to develop new ways of solving emerging problems.  Despite the recent 
successes of a top-down approach (stage 3 on Figure 4) in transforming practices at 
East Site, given the complexity of the current situations solutions may most effectively 
be developed not just by senior managers but also by those most intimately affected by 
them, i.e. the engineers themselves. 
 
In fact the need for new metaphors of design has been recognised by certain senior 
staff at East Site.  For example, reflecting on the uncertainty of the future one senior 
manager mused to us “what is life like on Mars?” and within the Company possible 
bases for new approaches currently exist.  The slogan “Right On Time” was proposed 
to us as an alternative to the phrase “Right First Time” and key figures in the 
Company are attracted to the discourse of “competency” which, as du Gay, Salaman 
and Rees (1996) have discussed, would involve the championing of proactive, 
empowered and entrepreneurial leaders and a strong emphasis on market relationships 
within the organisation itself.  Still another approach (that might have certain 
attractions in an engineering environment) is suggested by the metaphor of “managing 
chaos” (e.g. Stacey, 1992) with its analysis, drawn from the physical sciences, of 
emergent properties, self-organising systems and multiple solutions. 
 
Our own view, however, is that while new metaphors certainly must be sought it 
would probably be a mistake to place too much emphasis on any particular metaphor 
too early in the search process.  In the highly complex and internally stressed activity 
systems that are likely to be characteristic of Versatile Manufacturing and Innovation 
Intensive organisations of the future (see Figure 3) tolerance of, indeed the cultivation 
of multiple metaphors, might be a more appropriate aim.  Gergen (1992) has 
developed a similar point.  He argued that while dialogue in organisations may, at first 
sight, appear to threaten stability, paradoxically it is the suppression of dialogue that 
robs an organisation of its vitality and ability to act.  Gergen’s concern was to alert 
managers to the way in which the image of organisations as machines can stifle 
organisational creativity.  To facilitate movement around the cycle of questioning 
depicted in Figure 2 the cultivation of multiple images is, Gergen’s argument 
suggests, crucial to the process of search and experimentation.   
 
Questions of how the generation of dialogue and alternative images can be managed 
are, of course, crucial.  Pava’s (1983) analysis of the importance of forums of 
deliberation is of interest in this respect.  In addition to encouraging the articulation of 
multiple perspectives managers need also to attend to the location, ground rules and 
norms for the exchange of views.  In the case of East Site, for example, we formed the 
impression that, at the time of our study, there are insufficient forums to support 
debate between engineers and managers about the relative merits of the production 
process versus the scientist-inventor metaphors and the alternatives that might be 
usefully be considered. 
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To conclude, metaphors and images in management represent alternative systems of 
beliefs, values and assumptions about the design process.  They imply action and 
suggest appropriate institutional supports.  A robust and vigorous design process is the 
key the continued success of the Company described in this paper but the complexity 
of the activity systems engineers must work within presents a range of unfamiliar 
problems.  If the full potential of the knowledge workers upon whom organisations 
like this depend is fully to be unleashed, and if such organisations are to be able to 
cope with the tensions that inevitably develop within them, then there is no substitute 
for the development of an enriched process of dialogue, debate and learning. 
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